

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

THUCYDIDES 1. 22. 2

Καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοὶ τε ὦν αὐτὸς ἦκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. (2) τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἤξιωσα γράφειν, οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρὴν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβεῖα περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξεληθὼν.

Thucydides' programmatic statement has never lacked commentators. Both the general structure and the individual words and phrases of the passage have been subjected to exhaustive analysis and have often received markedly different interpretations. This is not surprising, since the passage—essential for an understanding of Thucydides' aims—is characteristically compact and elliptical. This is not least true of Thucydides' assertion that he wrote the deeds of the war οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος . . . οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει. It is the second of these phrases that I shall examine here.¹ Many interpretations of it have been offered, but I believe that its meaning can best be understood if we examine both Thucydides' use of the phrase elsewhere in his *History* and the way that his predecessor Herodotus had used it.

Earlier scholars thought that the phrase οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει was intended as polemic against, or to point a contrast with, Herodotus and Hecataeus—especially the latter, in his famous statement of method in the prooemium of his *Genealogies* (*FGrH* I F 1): 'Εκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὥδε μυθεῖται: τάδε γράφω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι: οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.² A. Grosskinsky's exhaustive study of 1. 22, however, first explained the internal structure of the entire passage. He noted that the antithesis (μὲν . . . δέ) of 1. 22 was intended to reflect a different treatment by the historian of λόγοι and ἔργα. The phrase οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει meant that the narration of ἔργα did not admit the same subjective element conceded to the λόγοι, and this distinction was made clear by the verbal echoes (cf. 1. 20. 1 ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν

1. On the first phrase, see F. Egermann, "Zu den Grundbegriffen der thukydideischen Geschichtsschreibung," *Althistorische Studien: Festschrift für H. Bengtson*, Historia Einzelschriften, 40 (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 46–48 (with references to his earlier discussions).

2. See F. Jacoby, "Herodotos," *RE* Suppl. 2 (1913): 474–75; id., "Hekataios (3)," *RE* 7 (1912): 2734–35; M. Pohlenz, "Thukydidesstudien III," *Nach. Gesellsch. Wiss. zu Göttingen* (Göttingen, 1920), p. 75 = *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2 (Hildesheim, 1965), p. 273.

μοι . . . εἰπεῖν).³ Picking up the analysis begun by Grosskinsky, W. Schmid analyzed 1. 22 with an almost mathematical precision, firmly establishing the verbal and structural parallels within the methodological chapter. Clearly, ἐδόκουν, connoting the subjectivity present in the composition of the λόγοι, was meant to contrast with the opposite expression, οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, employed for the ἔργα.⁴

The analyses of Grosskinsky and Schmid have made plain that the internal structure of 1. 22. 1–2 is carefully planned and self-contained and that the explanation of the methodology followed in the *History*, though perhaps not as full and clear as we might wish, was meant to be understood on its own terms: since it was difficult to remember the λόγοι exactly, a certain subjectivity and freedom of imagination were necessary for their creation;⁵ for the ἔργα this subjectivity was eliminated or at least severely limited by Thucydides' use of the greatest possible precision (ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβεῖα . . . ἐπεξελθόν)⁶—although Thucydides does not explain how he was able to attain this precision. It is therefore not necessary to see the phrase as polemic—direct or indirect—against one or more specific previous or contemporary authors.

Lionel Pearson, however, has criticized Thucydides for failing to follow the procedure outlined in 1. 22. Pearson assumes that because Thucydides said he would not write up the events of the war “as they were told to me by any chance informant, *nor in accordance with my personal opinions*” (Pearson's emphasis), he must have meant that he would express no opinions concerning the events themselves.⁷ This assumption is certainly unwarranted: nothing in 1. 22 precludes Thucydides from availing himself of a part of historiography that can be traced back to Hecataeus (cf. *FGrH* I F 127); and it is also unwarranted to adduce the Archaeology as an example of Thucydides' inconsistency, since—as von Fritz saw—Thucydides states that his method of writing οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει is limited to τὰ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ (1. 22. 2).⁸ Careful attention to this last point, coupled with an examination of ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ (*et sim.*) in Thucydides and Herodotus, will afford a clear understanding of what Thucydides meant by the phrase.⁹

3. *Das Programm des Thukydides* (Berlin, 1936), pp. 44–45; Grosskinsky doubted the presence of direct polemic against Hecataeus (pp. 49–50). Cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1940), p. 140, and id., *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, 1937), p. 159.

4. “Zu Thukydides I, 22, 1 und 2,” *Philologus* 99 (1954–55): 220–33.

5. The accuracy of Thucydides' speeches is a vast and vexed problem; my own opinion is closest to that of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), pp. 7–11.

6. Since not every event admitted of the same certainty: see K. von Fritz, *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1 (Berlin and New York, 1967), p. 619.

7. “Thucydides as Reporter and Critic,” *TAPA* 78 (1947): 37–60 (= *Selected Papers*, ed. D. Lateiner and S. Stephens [Chico, Calif., 1983], pp. 67–90).

8. *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, 2:281, n. 3.

9. The basic sense, of course, is “I think,” but translators frequently elaborate, emphasizing “opinion.” Some examples: “I thought not fit to write . . . such as I myself did but think to be true” (Hobbes, 1628); “I did not even trust my own impressions” (Crawley, 1876); “nor according to any notion of my own” (Jowett, 1881); “in accordance with my own whims” (E. C. Marchant, 1905); “nor as seemed to me probable” (Smith, 1919 [Loeb]); “non plus qu' à mon avis personnel” (de Romilly, 1953 [Budé]); “noch wie es mir gut schien” (Luschnat, *RE Suppl.* 12 [1971]: 1181).

I. ΔΟΚΕΩ IN HERODOTUS

Herodotus uses δοκέω and δοκέει μοι with reference to himself ninety-nine times throughout his work, in all the fields and subjects that it embraces, to give opinions or to mark a parenthetical qualification.¹⁰ It is noteworthy that in sixty of the ninety-nine passages δοκέω is followed or preceded by an explanation, and Herodotus' opinions rarely occur without his own comment upon them. Naturally, the explanations differ in fullness and quality, and perhaps not all would be considered satisfactory by modern historical standards. But the point is that they are not usually presented arbitrarily. These explanations take a variety of forms: autopsy is sometimes invoked;¹¹ reasoning is expressed in a γάρ-clause;¹² previous knowledge (οἶδα) or the results of inquiries are adduced.¹³ Where no explicit reason is given for a statement, one can frequently infer the reason from conjectures that Herodotus offers as asides or from the beliefs that he expresses elsewhere in the *Histories*, particularly on religious matters. When, for example, Herodotus says that he thinks Cleomenes' death was τίσις for Demaratus' (6. 84. 3), no discourse on retribution follows: it is assumed that one understands the process.

Sometimes δοκέω marks an obvious inference—for example, when Herodotus says that before Nitocris built a bridge uniting the two parts of Babylon separated by a river, "one had to cross in a boat, which, I think (ὥς ἐγὼ δοκέω), was difficult" (1. 186. 1). One finds frequent use of δοκέω in the geographical and anthropological passages. Since much of the natural world can be inspected, autopsy plays a primary role in geography, as when, for example, Herodotus concurs in the opinion that Egypt was formed from a gulf (2. 12. 1 ἰδὼν). So, too, some aspects of a people's νόμοι or θώματα can be verified by the same methods as those used for geographical inquiry. The Persians consider it folly to have dedications, altars, and temples, "as it seems to me" (ὥς μὲν ἔμοι δοκέειν), because they do not think that the gods have human form, as the Greeks do (1. 131. 2). Although the Caunians say they are from Crete, Herodotus thinks they are autochthonous (αὐτόχθονες δοκέειν ἔμοι εἶσι), because they differ from all other men in their customs (1. 172. 1).

Most important for our present purposes are those places where Herodotus uses δοκέω in historical matters. When Demaratus aids Xerxes in winning the crown from Darius, Herodotus speculates that even without Demaratus' advice

10. I have relied on J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge, 1938), though my categories differ from his. δοκέω (ὥς ἐγὼ δοκέω) (31): 1. 51. 3, 97. 2, 119. 2, 186. 1; 2. 11. 3, 12. 1, 15. 3, 23. 1, 34. 2, 50. 1, 53. 2, 63. 3, 93. 6, 125. 7, 131. 2; 3. 146. 1; 4. 31. 2, 32. 1, 53. 5, 96. 1, 155. 1, 155. 2, 180. 4; 7. 133. 2, 185. 2, 186. 1, 239. 2; 8. 112. 2, 133; 9. 65. 2, 81. 2. (ὥς) (ἐ)μοι δοκέει (δοκέουσι, ἐδόκεε, ἐδόκεον, δοκέειν) (66): 1. 58, 131. 2, 145, 152. 2, 172. 1; 2. 4. 1, 5. 1, 8. 3, 10. 1, 13. 2, 15. 2, 24. 1, 25. 3, 28. 2, 42. 5, 44. 5, 45. 2, 49. 1, 49. 3, 50. 2, 53. 3, 56. 1, 57. 1, 70. 1, 77. 3, 98. 2, 103. 1, 109. 3, 116. 1, 120. 5, 124. 4, 137. 5, 170. 2; 3. 5. 2, 13. 4, 16. 7, 38. 4, 45. 3, 135. 3, 137. 5; 4. 29, 50. 2, 87. 2, 167. 3, 189. 3, 198. 1; 5. 10. 1 (*bis*), 58. 1, 67. 1, 69. 1, 118. 2; 6. 30. 1, 84. 3, 95. 2; 7. 3. 4, 168. 3, 173. 4, 229. 2; 8. 22. 3, 30. 2, 63. 66. 1, 103, 129. 3; 9. 113. 2 (δοκέω also occurs twice without μοι, though it is clearly implied: 8. 73. 3, 9. 65. 2).

11. See 2. 8. 3, 12. 1, 131. 2; 5. 58. 1; autopsy is sometimes implied, as in 2. 137. 5; 3. 5. 2; 4. 198. 1.

12. See, e.g., 2. 10. 1, 13. 2; 4. 32. 1, 155. 1 and 2; 7. 239. 2; 8. 66. 1; 9. 113. 2.

13. Previous knowledge: 2. 23. 1 (ὅτι οἶδα in Herodotus, see B. Shimron, "Πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν," *Eranos* 71 [1973]: 45–51). Inquiries: 2. 34. 2, 44. 5, 50. 1; 4. 87. 2.

Xerxes would have prevailed, because Atossa was all-powerful (7. 3. 4). Those who believe that the Samians defeated Polycrates by themselves are wrong: why would they have called in the Spartans if they were able to act by themselves (3. 45. 3)? In such passages we see Herodotus reasoning out his opinions for his audience.

He does not, however, even in historical matters, always justify his opinion. Plutarch takes him to task (*De mal. Her.* 868A–E) especially for attributing the Phocians' refusal to medize to their hatred of Thessaly, and for suggesting that if Thessaly had taken the Greek side, Phocis would have medized (8. 30. 2). Plutarch says that Herodotus ought to have given the evidence (τὰ τεκμήρια) on which he based his opinion; and although Herodotus does state that he made this discovery by comparing accounts (ὡς ἐγὼ συμβαλλόμενος εὗρίσκω), it is true that he offers no specifics. The Corcyreans refused to help the Greeks at Artemisium and Thermopylae, Herodotus thinks, in the hope that their refusal could win favor with Xerxes after his expected victory (7. 168. 3). No evidence is given here. In another passage (8. 22), Herodotus conjectures why Themistocles carved into the rocks around Artemisium a message urging the Ionians to revolt before the coming sea battle: he expected either that the Ionians would read it without the king's knowledge and so would change sides, or that Xerxes, on seeing it, would distrust the Ionians and keep them out of the battle. Either way, of course, Themistocles would have accomplished his aim.

In all these examples, we see an attempt to explain, interpret, or guess at the motivations or intentions of historical characters. It is likely that even in those cases where Herodotus could discover the historical "facts" surrounding great events, he could not find out the intentions or motivations of the people who had done the deeds. His solution (and that of all historians since) was to use the knowledge available to him, or the assumptions about human nature on which he could rely, to reason out the most likely explanation for the actions. In this sense Herodotus' attempt to write "as it seemed to him" consisted not so much in writing his opinions (though the phrase carries that meaning) as in giving the reasoned conjectures that he formed when precise information was lacking.

To sum up then, Herodotus used *δοκέω* to convey a range of ideas, from unverified opinion (though this is rare) to historical deduction and interpretation. There are few places where the opinions are arbitrary; and even when no explanation precedes or follows, one can usually infer the reason for the statement from the opinions Herodotus expressed elsewhere in the *Histories*.¹⁴

II. ΔΟΚΕΩ IN THUCYDIDES

It is instructive now to look at the places where Thucydides uses the phrase *ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ* in his history. In doing so, I do not mean to exaggerate the importance of this phrase; to be sure, there are other ways to say "I think" in Greek.¹⁵ But a survey will reveal how Thucydides uses the phrase.

14. Cf. C. Dewald, "Narrative Surface and Authorial Voice in Herodotus' *Histories*," *Arethusa* 20 (1987): 161.

15. To express opinions, Thucydides uses (*int. al.*) νομίζω (1. 1. 2), οἶμαι (1. 10. 2, 2. 54. 3), and ἡγούμαι (1. 23. 6).

The phrase occurs thirteen times in eleven passages. They are as follows:

(1) 1. 3. 1–3 (*bis*): Δηλοῖ δέ μοι καὶ τότε τῶν παλαιῶν ἀσθένειαν οὐχ ἥκιστα· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν Τρωικῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται πρότερον κοινῇ ἐργασαμένη ἡ Ἑλλάς· (2) δοκεῖ δέ μοι, οὐδὲ τοῦνομα τοῦτο ξυμπασά πω εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸ Ἑλληνος τοῦ Δευκαλίωνος καὶ πάνυ οὐδὲ εἶναι ἡ ἐπὶ κλησὶς αὕτη. . . (3) οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ βαρβάρους εἶρηκε [sc. Ὅμηρος] διὰ τὸ μὴ δὲ Ἑλληνάς πω, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀντίπαλον ἐς ἓν ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθαι.

(2) 1. 9. 1, 3 (*bis*): Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὄρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστήρας ἄγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι. . . (3) ἃ [sc. χρήματα] μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβὼν καὶ ναυτικῶ ἅμα ἐπὶ πλεόν τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύσας, τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλεόν ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιήσασθαι.

(3) 1. 10. 3–4: ὁμος δὲ φαίνεται [sc. ἡ στρατεία] καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα. (4) πεποίηκε γὰρ [sc. Ὅμηρος] χιλιῶν καὶ διακοσίων νεῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτῆτου πεντήκοντα, δηλῶν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας.

(4) 1. 93. 6–7: ἐβούλετο γὰρ [sc. ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς] τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλὰς, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακὴν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσθίσεισθαι. (7) ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο, ἰδὼν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐφοδὸν εὐπωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

(5) 2. 17. 2: καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ μαντεῖον [sc. τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον] τοῦναντίον ξυμβῆναι ἢ προσεδέχοντο· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐνοίκησιν αἱ ξυμφοραὶ γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἢ ἀνάγκη τῆς οἰκήσεως, ὃν οὐκ ὀνομάζον τὸ μαντεῖον προῆδει μὴ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ποτὲ αὐτὸ κατοικισθόσμενον.

(6) 3. 89. 5: αἴτιον δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιοῦτου [sc. a tidal wave], ἡ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποστέλλειν τε τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐξαπίνης πάλιν ἐπισπωμένην βιαίτερον τὴν ἐπὶ κλυσὶν ποιεῖν· ἄνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

(7) 6. 55. 3 (on Harmodius and Aristogiton): Hippias, Pisistratus' eldest son, was tyrant when Hippias was murdered. (Evidence is then adduced.) οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν κατασχεῖν μοι δοκεῖ ποτὲ Ἰππίας τὸ παραχρῆμα βραδίως τὴν τυραννίδα, εἰ Ἰππαρχος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὦν ἀπέθανεν, αὐτὸς δὲ αὐθημερὸν καθίστατο.

(8) 7. 87. 5 (on the Sicilian expedition): ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ ὦν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσας λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον.

(9) 8. 56. 3 (412 B.C.): When Athenian envoys arrive to negotiate with Tissaphernes, Alcibiades is present but makes excessive demands so that the treaty will miscarry. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τὸ αὐτὸ βουλευθῆναι, αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑώρα ἐκείνον καὶ ὥς οὐ ξυμβήσειοντα, κτλ.

(10) 8. 64. 5: At the bidding of the oligarchic contingent, Diitrephes abolishes the democracy at Thasos. Two months later the Thasians revolt and return to democracy. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν Θάσον τάναντία τοῖς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστᾶσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, δοκεῖν δέ μοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων· σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρassoμένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπόλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες.

(11) 8. 87. 4: Tissaphernes goes to Aspendus, but accounts of his intentions differ. ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ σαφέστατον εἶναι διατριβῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν οὐκ ἀγαγεῖν, φθορὰς μὲν, ἐν ὧσιν παρήει ἐκείσε καὶ διέμελλεν, ἀνίσωσέως δέ, ὅπως μὴδετέροις προσθήμενος ἰσχυροτέρους ποιήσει, κτλ.

It is striking how seldom the expression occurs, compared with its use in Herodotus. Five of the occurrences are in the Archaeology; one is in the Pentecontaetia, one in an interpretation of an oracle, one in an explanation of a natural phenomenon, one in a digression on earlier Athenian history, and one as a qualification of his great claim for the Sicilian expedition; three come from Book 8. Now von Fritz has called attention to the importance of Thucydides' claim that he would not write ὥς ἔμοι δοκεῖ for τὰ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ;¹⁶ and in the first eight passages above, Thucydides has kept strictly to his word. Neither Agamemnon nor Themistocles nor Hippias and Hipparchus can properly be said to be part of the deeds of the war. In fact, all eight passages are quite Herodotean: the same sort of inference from probability (1-3, 7), the same attempt to explain motivation (4), the same means of judging the non-human world (the gods in 5, nature in 6), and the same qualification of opinion (8) all are visible.¹⁷ The various nuances introduced by the phrase appear far less often than in Herodotus because of Thucydides' style and approach.

But if one considers these eight places in Thucydides, remembering the contrast in 1. 22 between λόγοι and ἔργα and recalling both the way Herodotus uses the phrase and Hecataeus' prooemium, one can suggest the following explanation. When a historian says that he writes "as it seems to him," this does not mean that he writes simply in accordance with his own opinions, or at least it does not mean this primarily or exclusively (since it is surely impossible—and, for the historian, probably not desirable—to divest oneself of all one's opinions); it means that he employs a certain amount of imaginative historical reconstruction and at times uses his own reasoned conjectures (a better term than "opinions"). Historians of past events—Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides in the Archaeology, Pentecontaetia, and the digression on the tyrannicides—find this necessary far more often than do writers of contemporary history. One cannot know why Agamemnon was the leader of the Greeks, since poets are not as reliable as historians (1. 21. 1); but the historian (given probability and τὸ ἀνθρώπινον) can deduce why he was the leader. The reasons why Themistocles encouraged the construction of the Athenian fleet were lost in time; but the historian can conjecture that he did so primarily because he thought the king was more likely to return by sea than by land. Herodotus could not know why Themistocles carved his message to the Ionians on the rocks around Artemisium; but he must have been mainly concerned to weaken Xerxes' faith in the contingent. And when Hecataeus said that he would write his *Genealogies* ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι, he meant not that he would arbitrarily select those he liked and discard those he disliked, but that he would follow a consistent procedure to try to bring some order to the λόγοι of the Greeks.¹⁸ Where evidence is wanting,

16. See above, n. 8.

17. Thucydides does not normally qualify what we would consider opinions. At 7. 87. 5 the enormity of the claim probably motivates the qualification.

18. It is usually assumed that Hecataeus rationalized mythic accounts, but see C. W. Fornara, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 5-7. We perhaps get a glimpse of Hecataeus' approach in Herodotus' account of Helen (2. 120. 1-5); note in particular his conclusion: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῇ ἔμοι δοκεῖ εἶρηται.

the historian has recourse to probable conjecture and (at times) more loosely based opinion.

It is the need for this historical reconstruction, whether of actions or of motivations (or whatever else), that Thucydides is rejecting with the phrase οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει. Because he is writing contemporary history, Thucydides does not need to fall back upon an imaginative reconstruction (as he does with the λόγοι, because of their ephemeral nature), or to guess at motivation. This is the advantage of contemporary history: it allows the author to learn of actions and recover motivations from the actors themselves, from his own experience as an actor or eyewitness, and from other eyewitnesses. It thereby eliminates a great deal of the uncertainty that the writers of past history constantly face.¹⁹

III. BOOK 8

But one problem remains that was not mentioned by von Fritz or addressed specifically by Pearson. We can easily eliminate Agamemnon and Themistocles from τὰ ἔργα τῶν παρθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, but not Alcibiades, Diitrephes, and Tissaphernes; for the last three examples of the phrase ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ in Thucydides all occur within the narrative of the Peloponnesian War itself. If our interpretation is correct, we must explain this contradiction.

Two of the passages in Book 8 concern Tissaphernes. In the earlier passage, Thucydides reports that Alcibiades made excessive demands in his negotiations with Tissaphernes in 412 so that the treaty would miscarry. "And it seems to me (δοκεῖ δέ μοι) that Tissaphernes wished the same thing," Thucydides adds (8. 56. 3). It is noteworthy that Thucydides does not usually qualify the intentions he ascribes to historical characters.²⁰ Rather, he confidently ascribes motives and feelings even to people like Cleon and Nicias, whose deaths in or shortly after battle ought to have precluded certainty in such matters.²¹ A still more striking passage, again dealing with Tissaphernes' motivation, concerns his actions in 411, when he went to Aspendus but did not bring his entire fleet with him. Thucydides first states that there were many opinions concerning his failure to bring the fleet (8. 87. 3 πολλαχῇ εἰκάζεται), some saying this, others that (οἱ μὲν . . . , οἱ δέ . . . , ἄλλοι δέ); he then gives his own opinion (ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ σαφέστατον). Here, too, is something unprecedented, the giving of several opinions about a character's motivation, followed by the author's conjecture. There must certainly have been other occasions when a character's motivation was interpreted differently by different people, but on these other occasions Thucydides is silent. Tissaphernes alone has a certain mystery about his actions,

19. Cf. A. Momigliano, "La composizione della storia di Tucideide," *Mem. della R. Acad. delle Scienz. di Torino*, Classe di Scienze morali storiche e filologiche, Serie II, 68.1 (1930), p. 4.

20. On the question of Thucydides' sources here, see P. A. Brunt, "Thucydides and Alcibiades," *REG* 65 (1952): 59-96 (suggesting Alcibiades himself), and H. D. Westlake, "The Influence of Alcibiades on Thucydides, Book 8," *Mnemosyne* 38 (1985): 93-108 (suggesting an accomplice of Alcibiades).

21. The question of intentions and the ascription of motives in Thucydides is too complex to be discussed here; for different approaches, see V. Hunter, *Thucydides: The Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1972), passim (unfortunately, she discusses no passage in Book 8), and K. J. Dover, *Thucydides*, Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics, no. 7 (Oxford, 1973), p. 31.

and it is likely that a lack of full information—not any special characteristic or standing of Tissaphernes—is responsible.²²

The final passage is 8. 64. 5. In noting that Thasos surprised the Athenian oligarchic faction at Samos by overthrowing their oligarchy and returning to democracy, Thucydides says that “it seems” to him (δοκεῖν δέ μοι) that the same thing happened in many other cities as well. Here it is quite surprising that Thucydides appears not to know an ἔργον of the war: it is not a minor detail, nor is it like the estimates of casualties, which could be exaggerated. Could Thucydides not find out whether other cities revolted? Or is it more likely, as A. Andrewes has suggested, that Thucydides wrote this passage when his information was not yet complete?²³

Indeed, all three unusual passages are perhaps best explained with reference to the nature of Book 8 itself. Its unique character has been known since antiquity,²⁴ and despite some prominent exceptions, most scholars have seen it as unfinished, with an incompletely integrated narrative and contradictions in the factual reports.²⁵ Since this is the case, it is likely that these passages represent an early stage of Thucydides’ knowledge or narrative. Perhaps 8. 64. 5 would have been augmented by references to actual revolts when Thucydides learned of them. The motivations suggested at 8. 56. 3 and 8. 87. 4 might have been presented more authoritatively when Thucydides learned more about them or when he finally decided what motivations he wished to ascribe to Tissaphernes.

The interpretation of οὐδ’ ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει proposed here, then, may be summarized as follows: (1) The phrase means “not as I thought” and presents a contrast with (a) the freedom that Thucydides allows his imagination in composing λόγοι (ὥς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοί . . .) and (b) the imaginative reconstruction of ἔργα or motivations that historians of past events—like Hecataeus and Herodotus—needed to employ. (2) The phrase does not mean that Thucydides will withhold his opinions. (3) Thucydides’ narrative reads as if he consistently followed the principle stated in 1. 22,²⁶ since (a) in ten of its thirteen occurrences the phrase is used to qualify opinions that are based on inference and do not concern events of the war (τὰ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ) and (b) the phrase is used of the war’s events only in Book 8, probably as a result of the unfinished state of that book.²⁷

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22. Pace D. Lateiner, “Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet (Thucydides 8. 87),” *TAPA* 106 (1976): 273, n. 15, whose suggested parallels differ from 8. 87 in narrative tone and structure; cf. A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (London and Sydney, 1988), p. 16. Lateiner’s discussion of the historiographical importance of this passage is nevertheless quite valuable (see, e.g., p. 269, on Thucydides’ qualification at 8. 46. 5; cf. p. 272, n. 12).

23. A. W. Gomme, K. J. Dover, and A. Andrewes, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 5 (Oxford, 1979), p. 159.

24. See Dion. Hal. *De Thuc.* 16.

25. For a judicious survey, see Andrewes, *Historical Commentary*, 5:1–4, 369–75.

26. I say “reads as if” because it is a matter of Thucydides’ narrative tone, which as a rule conveys little or no sense of uncertainty.

27. I am grateful to D. N. Sedley, to an anonymous referee of *CP*, and to the Editor for suggestions and for improvements of earlier versions.